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From a multidimensional and dynamic approach, this article focuses
on the linkages between labour, unemployment, poverty and inequality,
examining the forms which social precarity has adopted in Mexico and
Argentina in the new economic environment. It contends that the
weakening of employment-based integration mechanisms, marked
inequalities in access to opportunities and increasingly rigid social
structures are evidence of strong exclusionary trends, which exhibit
specific characteristics in each country. After analysing national
trajectories and the levels of integration achieved under the import-
substitution industrialization model, the article examines the deterioration
of working and living conditions witnessed over the last few decades. It
concludes with a discussion of some of the dilemmas and challenges
which the transition towards more equitable, socially supportive and
inclusive societies poses in terms of research and public policy.
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I
Introduction
The labour market has not only lost its capacity to
promote integration and social mobility, but has also
become one of the main sources of vulnerability and
social exclusion for large, growing sectors of the
population. Increased levels of unemployment, labour
insecurity and social vulnerability not only suggest a
progressive weakening of the relationship between
economic growth and employment, but also cast serious
doubts on the ability of the new economic model to
absorb the labour supply and reduce poverty and
persistent, growing inequalities.
The drive towards integration, as Pérez Sainz
(2003) has pointed out, does not feed into the
globalization process, and the labour market plays a
larger role in the dynamics of social dis-integration
today than it did in the past. In addition to the erosion
of earlier integration mechanisms, rising disparities in
the distribution of opportunities to access the
“advantages” of current processes reflect a social
structure that is becoming increasingly rigid. The initial
conditions of an individual’s life play an ever more
important role in determining his or her fate, and
inherited disadvantages exact a heavy toll in an
environment marked by hostility towards the “losers”
in the new social game.
Social, economic and political institutions act as
mediators in the relationship between inequality in
the distribution of income and social exclusion, either
favouring or blocking opportunities for the shared
social experience that is essential to the exercise of
citizenship.1  In Latin America, social exclusion
processes are reflected in the conditions that
accompany the incorporation of vast sectors into
society, in their integration patterns (Faria, 1995),
which lead to an unfavourable form of inclusion (Sen,
2000) and the creation of a second-class type of
citizenship (Roberts, 2004). Disadvantages in this case
do not arise from being “left out”, but rather from the
segmentation produced by State institutions –in other
words, from differentiated inclusion in the social
system. This segmentation is a historical feature of
Latin American “welfare regimes”, and has emerged
with renewed force as social services are progressively
dismantled and “commodified”, drastically widening
social gaps through differential access to employment,
education, health care and housing opportunities, and
through differences in the quality of such opportunities.
The patterns and trajectories of these inclusion
processes display different characteristics in different
social contexts. The diverse nature of the social
structures of Latin American countries and the different
forms which expectations of well-being and equity can
assume –depending on the urbanization and social
stratification patterns, labour traditions and welfare
mechanisms involved in each case– must be
acknowledged in order to avoid simplistic, overly
broad assessments of the forms which social precarity
adopts in the new economic environment.2  The
cumulative disadvantages (Paugam, 1995) associated
with work precarity and precarity in other areas of
economic and social life (family, income, living
conditions and social contacts) is precisely what makes
certain groups more vulnerable than others to social
exclusion.
The experiences of Argentina and Mexico are
particularly illuminating in this regard. In the early
1990s, the two countries differed significantly in terms
of inequality, poverty, the role of the middle class in
the social structure, labour traditions, levels of social
protection, labour market adjustment mechanisms and
modes of insertion into the international economy.
However, the profound, widespread deterioration of
employment and the unprecedented levels of poverty
1 Similar levels of inequality may produce different effects in
terms of social exclusion, depending on the degree to which
opportunities to do and obtain things are a function of income
levels (Barry, 1998). Thus, when the quality of public health
and education services is even throughout and high enough to
be used by a large majority of the population, individual income
becomes less relevant. As T.H. Marshall observed in 1950 (see
Marshall, 1992), the extension of social rights is an instrument
for the elimination of inequalities arising from social origin
which influence the distribution of opportunities.
2 The concept of social precarity comprises living conditions,
work conditions and their mutual implications. Precarity of
living conditions involves inadequate income, the duration of
financial deprivation over time, its impact on housing, its
corrosive effect on social, family and marital networks , etc.
Precarity of work conditions involves the nature and quality of
employment, and the implications these factors hold in terms
of job satisfaction and prospects for mobility, learning, personal
development and other issues (see Gallie and Paugam, 2002).
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and inequality suffered by Argentina during the 1990s
–which were made worse by the 2001 crisis– and the
persistence and entrenchment of a highly segmented,
inequitable social structure in Mexico have brought
the two countries closer together, in terms of
distributional inequity, than they were at the beginning
of the decade.3
This article examines the main trends and
manifestations of social decline in Argentina and Mexico
during the 1990s from a multidimensional, comparative
perspective, exploring the forms which the relationship
between labour, unemployment, poverty and inequality
have adopted in each case. Section II analyses both the
integrative and exclusionary dynamics of the import-
substitution industrialization strategy that prevailed in
both countries –at varying rates and degrees of intensity–
between 1950 and 1980. It notes that the disparities in
the integration achieved during this period are key to
understanding the dimensions and depth of the
deterioration of working and living conditions which
followed the model’s dismantling. Section III highlights
certain aspects that help to explain the various forms
which labour market transformations can assume, noting
the convergence of different elements, such as patterns
of engagement with the international economy, labour
traditions and their influence on the concepts and
practices surrounding the idea of “work” and
unemployment, and the various manifestations of the
relationship between employment, unemployment, the
informal sector and poverty in both countries.4  Section
IV explores the progressive hardening of the social
structure in two key dimensions: inequality in the
distribution of educational opportunities and the
weakening of opportunities for social mobility through
employment, particularly for sectors in the lower reaches
of the occupational structure. The conclusions in section
V highlight some of the main dilemmas and challenges
which the transition towards more equitable, supportive
and inclusive societies poses in terms of research and
public policy.
II
Development strategies, employment and social
integration: unfulfilled expectations,
forgotten promises
Inequality and poverty are certainly not new to Latin
America. An evaluation of the impact of different
strategies or development models on the social structures
of Latin American countries does, however, reveal
differences in their capacity to achieve integration.
Until the 1980s, the relationship between economic
growth and productive absorption of the labour force,
as well as an incipient welfare regime (albeit a limited
and imperfect one marked by significant disparities
between countries and regions), fuelled the expectations
3 During the first half of the 1990s, Argentina was in the middle
of the scale among the countries of its region in terms of
inequality in the distribution of income, according to the Gini
coefficient. By the end of the decade, it had reached a high
level of inequality (the joining the ranks of most of the other
countries of Latin America). By 2002, it was (together with
Brazil and Honduras) one of the most unequal countries in the
region. Mexico remained among the group of countries with
high levels of inequality between 1990 and 1999, moving to
the middle of the scale in 2002 (ECLAC, 2004). The recent
decline in the concentration of income in Mexico should be
approached with caution. It is unusual, given the country’s
difficult economic situation, in which production has become
stagnant and per capita income has dropped by 2.6% between
2000 and 2002. Changes have also been made in the sample
design (size and distribution of the sample) and questionnaire
of the 2002 National Household Income and Expenditure
Survey, which makes comparisons with the 2000 survey
difficult (see ECLAC, 2003, inset I.4).
4 It should be noted that the research data available for both
countries date from 2002 or earlier and cover a period of low
economic performance in Mexico and full-fledged crisis in
Argentina. This has specific implications for some of the
problems addressed in this article –particularly in section III,
subsection 2, which covers the informal sector and vulnerability,
and explores the relationship between work precarity,
unemployment and poverty. The lack of comparable, more
recent data has restricted the author’s ability to explore the
behaviour of these variables in Argentina and Mexico beyond
the stages of the business cycle.
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of social mobility of large sectors of the population in
Latin America. Urbanization, industrialization, the
development of a public education system and the
expansion of non-manual labour were expected to
produce more equitable societies. Some countries came
closer to fulfilling these expectations than others, where
they became unfulfilled promises for large portions of
the population.5
While the capacity for integration of the import-
substitution industrialization model varied greatly
among and within the countries of the region, the
labour market was dominated by integrative trends,
and formal employment was its point of reference.6
Even though workers in the urban and rural informal
sectors were excluded from welfare subsidies –mostly
in the form of social security benefits– the degree to
which they were excluded varied significantly within
the region.7  As Filgueira (1998) notes, these variations
have been completely “forgotten” by the neoliberal
critique of the import-substitution model –an oversight
which has made it impossible to understand the diverse
effects of the model’s dismantling in Latin America.
The decline that followed was certainly more marked
and severe in countries which had achieved a greater
degree of integration when the model was in force.
Table 1 compares some of the characteristics of the
labour markets of Argentina and Mexico between 1950
and 1980. In Argentina, urbanization, industrialization
and an increasing shift towards wage employment
among the economically active population (EAP)
emerged earlier than they did in Mexico and the rest of
the region; formal employment also played a greater
role in Argentina, and underutilization of labour –in terms
of underemployment and unemployment– was lower.
5 Different levels and rates of urbanization, industrialization
and population growth, as well as the expansion of the public
educational system, among other factors, created heterogeneous
social structures in which the relative importance of the urban
working class and the middle class varied from country to
country. Consequently, while these classes generally had a
stronger presence in Argentina and Uruguay in 1970 (20%
manual agricultural labourers, 40% non-agricultural manual
labourers and 40% middle and upper strata), the same could
not be said of Mexico, where their presence was much lower
(45%-30%-25%), and Brazil (50%-30%-20%). The size of these
classes was extremely small in countries such as Guatemala
(60%-30%-10%). See Gurrieri and Sainz (2003), p. 156.
6 Although it never absorbed a majority of the workforce, formal
employment grew steadily between 1950 and 1980, generating
six of every ten new jobs. Thus, 40% of new jobs were in the
informal sector, 15% were in the public sector and the remaining
45% were provided by mid-sized and large private businesses
(Klein and Tokman, 2000, p. 18).
7 For an analysis of the relationship between the informal sector
and the development of social citizenship in Latin America, see
Bayón, Roberts and Saraví (1998).
TABLE 1
Latin America, Argentina and Mexico: Characteristics of the labour market
in Latin America, 1950-1980
(In percentages of the Economically Active Population – EAP)
Urban Salaried Manufacturing Servicesb Urban formal Under- Unem-
EAP employmenta employmentc  employmentd ployment
Latin America
1950 43.5 53.6 14.1 25.7 30.1 46.5 –
1980 64.0 58.9 18.3 38.2 44.6 42.2 –
Argentina
1950 72.0 71.3 24.5 42.1 56.8 22.8 4.9e
1980 84.4 72.2 21.0 54.6 65.0 25.7 2.6
Mexico
1950 34.5 51.1 11.2 20.4 21.6 56.9 7.0e
1980 61.5 63.4 19.0 36.1 39.5 40.4 4.5
Source:  PREALC (1982) and ECLAC (1990).
a Data on salaried employment for 1950-1970 period.
b Services includes commerce, shipping and services.
c Defined by the Regional Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC) as those urban EAP categories not
included in the urban informal sector.
d Defined as the sum of the urban informal sector (non-professional own-account workers, unpaid family workers and domestic
workers) and traditional rural workers.
e 1970 figures.
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In Argentina (which, along with Uruguay and
Chile, embarked on a development process quite early
on and which pioneered the creation and expansion of
a social security system) the integrative effect of import-
substitution industrialization manifested itself in
relatively low levels of social inequality, poverty and
underutilization of labour. These levels remained
steady until the mid-1970s, placing the country in a
privileged position in Latin America.8  This may be
attributed to the convergence of several factors, such
as slow population growth, higher levels of
urbanization, a more rapid shift to wage-based
employment and the early expansion of the public
education system. Coverage in basic social services such
as health and education was almost universal. The
formal sector provided over 70% of wage employment
(Marshall, 1998), and the informal sector –surrounded
by a dynamic domestic market and a growing middle
class– took on some quite unique characteristics. Unlike
its counterparts in other Latin American countries, it
was not a “refuge” or subsistence mechanism. On the
contrary, it was made up of stable, self-employed workers
with relatively high incomes, mid-level skills and
moderate productivity rates. A significant percentage
of this workforce had access to fringe benefits.9
While integration was less successful in Mexico,
the country underwent profound, accelerated social and
economic transformations during this period.
Industrialization and urbanization came late, and
advanced rapidly, transforming a basically rural and
agricultural country into a predominantly urban, semi-
industrial one.10  Coverage in basic services, such as
education and health care, expanded, but their quality
was lower than in Southern Cone countries, and
significant regional disparities –both quantitative and
qualitative– emerged in their provision. The
segmentation of social services increased, not only as a
result of lower basic-service coverage, but also due to
the expansion of the informal sector. Wage employment
ratios fell, and the income and benefits associated with
formal employment were not as significant as they were
in early-development countries (see table 1). As of 1978,
following a period of steady growth in State health-care
coverage, social security institutions covered only 38%
of the overall population –nominally– while 45% of
the population, mostly in rural areas, received no cost-
free or quasi-cost-free medical care (COPLAMAR, 1985).
Despite the reduction of inequality in the
distribution of income that took place between 1963
and 1984, inequity in the distribution of the benefits
of growth remained, even during the “golden years”.
By the end of the period, the wealthiest 20% of the
population received over 50% of available income,
and almost 6 out of every 10 Mexicans continued to
live in poverty (Moreno Brid and Ros, 2004).11
The privileged position of Argentina began to
gradually deteriorate in 1975. In less than three
decades, the social structure of the country underwent
a transformation without parallel in Latin America.
Inequality and poverty increased, and earlier channels
of social mobility were significantly weakened. These
changes first began appearing in the mid-1970s, as the
previous development model ran its course. During
the 1990s, a new socioeconomic model emerged. The
new model not only involved new patterns of insertion
into the global economy, but also created new
relationships between households and the labour
market and the State, which shook the country’s social
structure to its roots.12
8 Urban poverty levels in Argentina circa 1970 were between
4% and 5%, and the Gini coefficient of household income
distribution was 0.41% between 1953 and 1961, compared to
0.52 in Mexico and 0.57 in Brazil (Altimir and Beccaria, 1999).
9 Between the mid-1940s and 1970, the growth of small-scale
commerce accounted for almost half of the growth of own-account
activities, and almost 5 in 10 self-employed workers belonged to
the middle class (Torrado, 1992). The low cost of repairs in relation
to the price of consumer goods also contributed to the growth of
own-account mechanical, electrical and electronic-appliance repair
work among the working class during this period (Marshall, 1978).
10 Between 1940 and 1980, the economy grew at an annual rate
of 6.4%, and the share of manufacturing in GDP rose from
15.4% to 24.9%. The percentage of the population living in
urban areas rose from 35% to 66%, and the overall population
increased almost fourfold, from 20 million to 70 million.
Literacy rates doubled, reaching 83%; average schooling among
the adult population rose from 2.6 to 4.6 years, and life
expectancy at birth rose from 24 to 65 (INEGI, 1985).
11 According to Cortés (2000), the reduction in the concentration
of income which took place between 1963 and 1984 (when the
Gini coefficient dropped from 0.523 to 0.456) was due mainly
to an increase in the relative share of the country’s intermediate
and lower deciles caused by a drop in the share of the wealthiest
10%. This trend was interrupted and reversed in later years,
when the participation of the upper decile rose consistently.
12 Between 1974 and 1991, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.36 to
0.447, reaching 0.51 in 2000. Income differences between the
richest and the poorest decile tripled, and poverty levels increased
fourfold. In 1974, the average per capita income of the richest
10% of households was 12 times that of the poorest 10%; in 1991
it was 23 times higher, and in 2000 it was 38 times higher. Poverty
in Greater Buenos Aires in 1974 affected no more than 5% of
households; this figure rose to 9% in 1986, and 25% in 1990
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The occupational structure of Mexico underwent
profound changes during the 1980s, beginning with
the crisis of 1982. Their basic effect was to lower the
more modern sectors’ share of total employment, as
informal employment (primarily self-employment and
unpaid family work) increased. In absolute terms,
informal employment increased by 80% between
1980 and 1987, absorbing 33% of the labour force by
1987 (ECLAC, 1989).13  Instead of improving in 1988-
1994, when the Mexican economy expanded
moderately as a result of a new growth strategy, the
shortfall of stable, adequately remunerated
employment since 1982 –described by Lopez (1999)
as a “structural imbalance”– worsened, as did inequity
in the distribution of income. The Gini coefficient
rose from 0.456 to 0.514 between 1984 and 1992,
and the concentration of income in the richest 10%
of the population rose from 34.2% to 40.5% during
the same period (Cortes, 2000). A general overview
of the 1990s reveals a transfer of income from the
poorest households to the richest ones, with little
variation occurring in the relative position of middle-
income households. The country’s entry into the
North American Free Trade Agreement, the 1995 crisis
and its after-effects not only slowed the growth of the
population’s purchasing power, but also tilted it in
favour of the richest 10% at the expense of the real
income of the rest of the country’s households –especially
the poorest 30% of the population. As a result,
inequality levels in the year 2000 were similar to those
of the 1960s (Hernández Laos, 2003).
This preliminary analysis is necessary in order to
understand the extent and depth of the social decline
experienced by Argentina and Mexico during the
1990s, as well as the disruptive impact of that decline
on their social fabric. Roberts (2004) notes that,
compared to other nations such as Brazil, the countries
of Central America and Peru, the middle and working
classes of Argentina and Uruguay face a much steeper
decline in their living standards and a more dramatic
reconfiguration of their employment opportunities.
This situation is compounded by another important
factor: the memory of better times. Unlike Argentina
and Uruguay, the urban populations of many Latin
American countries have no “golden” benchmarks in
the past with which to evaluate present crises. They
have always struggled for survival. This is a difference
which affects not only political life, but also the formal
and informal mechanisms employed to deal with crises
(Roberts, 2004).
following a bout of hyperinflation; in 1994 it dropped to less than
15% and climbed once again to 21% in 2000 (Damill, Frenkel and
Maurizio, 2002; Beccaria, Altimir and González Rozada, 2003).
Wage employment not registered with the social security system
rose from 19% in 1974 to 27.3% in 1990, reaching 38% in 2000,
while unemployment increased more than sevenfold, from 2.6%
to 19% between 1980 and 2001 (Permanent Household Survey,
National Institute of Statistics and Censuses).
13 The discrepancies between these data on informal employment
in Mexico in 1980 and the figures in table 1 arise from the fact that
the latter were calculated based on the urban EAP, whereas the data
obtained from ECLAC (1989) refer to the labour force as a whole.
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III
The worsening of the labour market:
a comparative overview
Despite the similarities between the economic policies
applied in Mexico and Argentina –particularly during
the first half of the 1990s (stabilization, trade and
finance liberalization, privatization)– and the
vulnerability of both countries to external
disturbances, their labour markets adjusted very
differently. Open unemployment, which stood at similar
levels in both countries at the end of the 1980s, rose
sharply in Argentina, whereas in Mexico it remained
low (see figure 1).14
In Argentina, the evolution of employment, poverty
and inequality indicators during the 1990s was
convincing, painful proof of the country’s progressive
social decline. There was no European-style welfare
regime in place to deal with drastic increases in
unemployment, job insecurity and poverty, and the
“cushions” or “escape valves” found in Mexico and
14 Open unemployment has fallen substantially in Argentina
since 2002, whereas it has been on the rise in Mexico since
2000; as of 2004, however, Argentina still possessed one of the
highest unemployment levels in the region, while Mexico had
one of the lowest.
15 The issue of Mexican labour force migration to the United
States lies beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted,
however, that both this analysis and the manifestations of social
decline in Mexico over the past few decades help to explain the
forms migration has adopted as job opportunities contract and
deteriorate, making it an increasingly complex and diverse
phenomenon. In this regard, Canales (2002) emphasizes the
need to view changes in the patterns and profiles of migration
in the light of the social, economic and political transformations
which have taken place in Mexico and the United States since
the mid-1980s and which have significantly redefined relations
between the two countries.
16 In 2000, the real minimum wage was only one third of what
it had been in 1980, and salaries and wages paid by the largest
manufacturing enterprises had fallen to less than 40% of their
1990 levels (Salas and Zepeda, 2003, p. 65).
other Latin American countries –namely, maquilas
(offshore processing plants), migration and the informal
sector15– were also either lacking or weak. In Mexico,
these cushions helped keep unemployment relatively
low, although they failed to improve living or working
conditions for large segments of the population.
While working conditions deteriorated in both
countries during the 1990s, the characteristics of their
decline differed. In Argentina, the main –though certainly
not the only– labour-market adjustment mechanism was
unemployment, whereas in Mexico low unemployment
was accompanied by a significant reduction in wages,
coupled with growth in the informal sector. A low open
unemployment rate, high levels of informal-sector
employment, low wages and a low share of wages in GDP
were among the distinctive characteristics of the Mexican
economy (Lopez, 1999).16
In Argentina, where the labour market had
traditionally been characterized by higher levels of
formal employment and protection, the rapid growth
of unemployment and precarious employment
(underemployment and employment lacking social
security benefits) was accompanied by a drop in the
capacity of the informal sector to absorb labour,
especially where self-employment activities were
concerned. During the 1990s, save for 1996, when the
aftershocks of the severe crisis of 1995 were being felt,
unemployment rates in Mexico were actually the lowest
FIGURE 1




Source: ECLAC (2004c and 2004d).
a  Average annual rate of urban unemployment.
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in the region. In Argentina, on the other hand,
unemployment rose during the 1990s, even during
periods of higher growth.
It has been repeatedly argued that low
unemployment in Mexico can be attributed to the lack
of an unemployment insurance system, as well as the
scant saving capacity of the country’s workers, who
must accept any work available, or “invent” jobs where
none exist. This is a relevant argument, which can be
used, and empirically supported, to analyse conditions
within the country’s borders. It falls short, however,
when the problem is approached from a comparative
perspective. The issue certainly becomes more complex
when one considers events in other Latin American
countries –particularly Argentina, where
unemployment not only rose sharply during the 1990s,
but also had a disproportionately strong effect on the
poorest, most vulnerable sectors (those with the lowest
saving capacity and very limited access to
unemployment benefits). In order to understand the
multiple dimensions of the problem, three factors
should be taken into account.
First, the points of comparison must be clarified.
The lack of an unemployment insurance system might
be a relatively valid explanation for low unemployment
in Mexico, if that country were being compared to the
European nations – although social protection systems
in Europe are highly diverse, and the subject itself is
widely debated.17  It does not, however, explain why
unemployment levels in Mexico are low compared to
the rest of Latin America. The region’s “real”
unemployment insurance systems are sharply limited
–in those countries where they exist– by very low coverage
(in a setting where formal and stable employment is far
from the norm) and low payments. An insurance system
which never covered more than 6% of the unemployed
population can hardly explain why upward of 20% of the
EAP in Argentina has succumbed to unemployment
during times of severe crisis, while unemployment in
Mexico has never exceeded 6% (see figure 1).18
The second factor to consider is the link between
poverty and unemployment. In Argentina, the strong
relationship and feedback between these two
phenomena cast doubt on the idea of unemployment
as a “luxury” –enjoyed by sectors with higher levels
of schooling and greater saving capacity– which the
poor “cannot afford”. While it is true that, from the
1990s onward, unemployment spread to all
occupational categories and levels of schooling, it had
a disproportionate effect on those who were most
deprived in terms of education and skills. Statistics for
Greater Buenos Aires show that unemployment among
the poorest 10% of the population rose from 14.3% to
29.8% between 1990 and 2000 (Permanent Household
Survey, INDEC).
The third, often overlooked, factor is the influence
of labour traditions on the way in which work and
unemployment are defined and experienced. These
traditions serve as frames of reference that reveal the
degree to which unemployment constitutes a clearly
recognizable category. Qualitative data show that in
Argentina (whose labour market has historically
possessed some of the highest levels of formal
employment in the region), the stability and rights
associated with “work” not only affect perceptions of
what constitutes a “good job”, but also influence the
very definition of work and social belonging, even in
an environment of severe job insecurity (Bayón, 2002).
Labour rights tend to be intertwined with the very
concept of employment, even among low-income,
unskilled workers who have never fully enjoyed those
rights. The expression changa, which refers to odd jobs,
is locally used to describe all those activities which
“do not” constitute work.
In societies like that of Mexico, characterized by
strong traditions and patterns of informal employment
and consumption, where wage work has been less
important historically, work tends to be associated
more with income generation than with stability and
protection, and the concept of unemployment is less
17 A comparative analysis of European Union countries shows
little empirical evidence to suggest that welfare benefits
–specifically, the existence of an unemployment compensation
system– reduces incentives to work, or, to put it in other terms,
stimulates unemployment. The issue is certainly more complex,
and depends not only on the extent and monetary amount of
the benefits provided, but also on the interaction of policies
(for example, welfare benefits and active labour-market
policies). See, among others, Esping-Andersen and Regini
(2000) and Gallie and Paugam (2000).
18 In Argentina, the National Employment Act of 1991 provides
for an unemployment insurance system; it only applies,
however, to stable employment, and is limited to certain
segments of the formal sector. This explains its scant coverage
during a period of extended job insecurity. Workers dismissed
without cause from a registered job who have paid into the
social security system for at least 12 of the 36 months preceding
dismissal are entitled to unemployment compensation. The
system applies to wage earners covered by the Employment
Contract Act, and thus excludes construction workers (for whom
a separate regime exists), domestic workers, and persons
employed in the public and rural sectors.
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recognizable to the population.19  Several studies of
Mexico (and daily urban life in that country) confirm
that self-employment activities or, to put it in other
terms, the ability to “invent” ways of generating income
to cover household needs, is a family labour tradition
among low-income groups (Estrada Iguiñiz, 1996).
According to Selby, Murphy and Lorenzen (1994), poor
city dwellers are more interested in providing their
families with the resources needed to live than in
holding a single, steady job. Expressions such as
“trying to get by” (buscando la manera), “slaving
away” (haciéndole la lucha), “hustling” (poniéndose
abusado), etc., are vivid, gritty examples of the
“whatever it takes” mentality of the urban poor.
While these three elements do not represent an
exhaustive analysis of labour-market adjustments in
the two countries under review, they do draw attention
to the multidimensional nature of the problem. With
the same objective in mind, we will now examine three
dimensions that are key to understanding the different
ways in which the labour market has deteriorated in
Argentina and Mexico. The first dimension involves
the relationship between changes in a country’s
employment structure and the way it positions itself in
the international economy. The second focuses on the
problem of informal employment and lack of social
protection. The third explores the various forms which
the relationship between work, unemployment and
poverty has taken in each country.
1. Export model and manufacturing jobs
The export structures of Argentina and Mexico reflect
their contrasting positions within the international
market. Argentina’s export sector is highly specialized
in goods that require intensive use of natural resources,
whereas Mexico is strongly geared towards
manufacturing (both of the maquila and non-maquila
variety). Primary goods accounted for 71% and 66%
of Argentine exports in 1990 and 2001, respectively,
while the share of manufacturing –most of it labour
intensive– in Mexican exports increased from 43% to
85% during the same period (UNDP, 2003).
This pattern of specialization has had different
effects on job creation, especially in the manufacturing
sector. Argentina underwent a significant de-
industrialization process in the mid-1970s, and the
number of jobs provided by its manufacturing sector
shrank, with manufacturing employment falling by
66% between 1976 and 2001. During the 1990s, trade
liberalization and currency overvaluation radically
transformed the relative prices of labour and capital.
This shift had a negative impact on labour demand in
the tradable goods sector and encouraged the
substitution of capital for labour, which led to a strong
gain in productivity.20  Those businesses that were able
to survive increased their investment in capital assets,
cutting their payrolls even during the brief expansion
of 1991-1994. To this was added the loss of jobs
resulting from the shutdown of small and medium-sized
industrial enterprises and the implementation of labour-
saving measures without additional investment in fixed
assets. Despite high economic growth in Argentina
during the early 1990s (mainly between 1991 and
1994), unemployment grew almost without interruption
from 1991 onward (Katz, Bisang and Burachik, 1995;
Heymann, 2000).
Between 1991 and 1999, manufacturing
employment in Argentina fell by 46.6%, whereas in
Mexico it rose by 28.8% (Stallings and Weller, 2001).
This reflects the “cushion” effect of the Mexican
maquila industry –whose share of industrial
employment rose from 14% to 30% between 1990 and
2000– in the face of manufacturing job losses in other
sectors. However, the boom in maquila jobs, which
doubled in just five years, from 650,000 in 1995 to
almost 1,300,000 in 2000, is beginning to show signs
of tapering off. Almost 230,000 such jobs have been
lost in only three years (between 2000 and 2003), and
the share of manufacturing in urban employment has
dropped from 29.3% to 26% (INEGI, 1985; ILO, 2004).
The displacement of manufacturing-sector
workers and the increase in the labour supply in Mexico
were absorbed primarily by an expansion of
employment in the service sector, where the number of
full-time jobs increased, especially in activities
characterized by a greater predominance of informal
work, such as commerce. This sector accounted for one
of every four new jobs created during the 1990s (Frenkel
and Ros, 2004).
Argentina outpaced Mexico in terms of
manufacturing job loss, while full-time employment
19 Gallie, Jacobs and Paugam (2000) note that, in the south of
Italy, the prevalence of labour precarity has altered the way
unemployment is perceived and experienced, as well as future
work expectations, since the informal economy is the primary
means of coping with poverty and job insecurity.
20 After Argentina devalued its currency at the end of 2001,
employment in this sector surged, growing 16% between 2002
and 2004 (Encuesta Industrial Mensual, INDEC).
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in almost all of its non-tradable goods sectors –with
the partial exception of financial services,
communications and transportation– remained
stagnant between 1991 and 2000. Consequently,
employment in these sectors failed to offset job losses
in other sectors of the economy. The main result of
strong employment in the service sector was a steady
increase in underemployment.21  Underemployment in
Greater Buenos Aires, which rose from 8.3% to 15.1%
between 1990 and 2000 and reached 16.8% in 2004
(Permanent Household Survey, INDEC), was one of the
clearest manifestations of the deterioration of the labour
market in terms of income and job insecurity.22  The
loss of full-time manufacturing jobs was partially offset
by underemployment in the service sector, which, given
its countercyclical nature, played a similar role to that
of the informal sector in Mexico (Frenkel and Ros, 2004).
2. Informal employment and lack of social
protection
In Argentina, high levels of unemployment were
accompanied by a slowdown in self-employment,
which increased the vulnerability of large groups of
workers –particularly middle-aged persons with little
schooling– to exclusion from the labour market.23  In
Argentina, the share of informal employment
accounted for by self-employed work fell from 22.9%
to 17.5% between 1990 and 2002, as shown in table 2,
whereas in Mexico it rose from 19% to 21% during the
same period. The contrasting behaviour of self-
employment in commerce and services in the two
countries is particularly striking: it dropped from 16%
to 10.7% in Argentina, and rose from 12.5% to 16.1%
in Mexico.
During the 1990s, unlike previous decades, the
growth of salaried employment in Mexico lost
momentum. The share of wage employment in the
employed EAP dropped from 76.4% to 73.1% between
1989 and 2002.24  The reduction of the public sector’s
share of wage employment –from 16.1% to 13.2%
between 1994 and 2002– and a drop in employment
among businesses with more than five workers –from
48.1% to 32% during the same period– help to explain
the slowdown (ECLAC, 2003). Employment grew faster
in those sectors which had traditionally been the most
precarious –microenterprises, domestic work and
unskilled self-employment. As of 2002, these sectors
accounted for almost half of the urban employed
population. In other words, 5 out of every 10 Mexican
workers are “integrated” into the most precarious
segments of the labour market, where the lack of social
protection reaches alarming levels: only 1 in 10 workers
in the informal sector has access to retirement benefits
(see table 3). Informal workers are not, however, the
only ones lacking fringe benefits; according to statistics
for 2000, 4 out of 10 wage workers in the formal sector
(employed by larger businesses or in the public sector)
do not have those rights. As a result, in Mexico (the
country with the lowest unemployment levels in Latin
America), a large majority of workers lack social
protection. The situation has worsened in recent years:
the employed population (both wage earners and
others) without access to welfare benefits rose from
61.4% to 63% between 2001 and 2004, reaching 64%
during the first quarter of 2005.25
Table 3 shows the degree to which the employment
situation deteriorated in Argentina during the 1990s.
Despite the unprecedented intensity and scope of job
insecurity during that period, several indicators show
that Argentina still possessed stronger social protection
mechanisms than Mexico. The most visible differences
between the two countries involve retirement benefits
or pensions for persons over the age of 65 (68.7%
coverage in Argentina, compared to 20%-25% in
Mexico), access to health insurance through
employment (61% and 39%, respectively) and
severance compensation for wage earners (56%,
compared to 20%).
21 Underemployed persons are those who work fewer than 35
hours a week for reasons beyond their control and who wish to
work more hours.
22 As of October 2000, 7 of every 10 part-time workers were
underemployed, and 71.4% lacked access to fringe benefits
(Permanent Household Survey, INEGI). While the real average
income of full-time wage earners rose by 17%, that of
underemployed workers fell by 15% between 1991 and 2000
(Damill, Frenkel and Maurizio, 2002).
23 This slowdown in self-employment can be attributed to the
disappearance of numerous small stores and repair shops that
were unable to compete with large supermarket chains and a
massive influx of imported goods, as well as diminishing
employment opportunities in certain services (such as repair
work, due to an increase in access to credit for the purchase of
durable consumer goods at the beginning of the decade), among
other factors.
24 Between 1970 and 1990, wage employment increased by
154%, and own-account employment rose by 87%. Wage
employment became the norm only in the manufacturing sector,
however, since non-wage employment continued to
predominate in commerce and, to a lesser degree, the service
sector (Rendón and Salas, 2000).
25 INEGI (2001, 2004 and 2005).
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Higher levels of social protection in Argentina
conceal significant inequities in their distribution.
According to a living conditions survey (Encuesta de
Condiciones de Vida) conducted in 2001, 64.2% of
the population over 65 was covered by some type of
contributory or non-contributory retirement plan. This
percentage was halved, however (32.2%), among the
poorest 20% of the population; coverage in the second
quintile was 57.2%, and in the highest quintile it was
78.5% (ILO/MECON, 2005).
3. Labour precarity, unemployment and poverty
The relationship between job instability, poverty and
lack of social protection manifests itself differently in
TABLE 2
Argentina and Mexico:  Employed population in the informal sector, 1980-2002
(As percentages of total employed urban population)
Micro-enterprises Self-employed unskilled workers
Total Employers Salaried Domestic Total Manufacturing Commerce
workers work and construction and services
Argentina
1980 48.9 2.6 10.2 3.9 32.2 6.5 25.7
1990 44.4 3.8 12.0 5.7 22.9 6.9 16.0
1997 41.4 3.7 15.9 5.1 16.7 4.6 12.1
2000 42.2 3.4 16.0 5.3 17.5 5.1 12.4
2002 42.1 2.9 16.1 5.6 17.5 6.8 10.7
Mexico
1984 … … … 2.6 24.7 2.1 14.0
1989 … … … 2.7 18.9 3.0 12.5
1996 43.7 3.8 15.8 3.6 20.4 3.8 15.7
1998 44.3 3.9 15.9 4.1 20.4 3.2 16.4
2000 42.5 3.9 16.0 3.0 19.6 3.6 15.1
2002 47.2 3.4 18.3 4.6 20.9 4.2 16.1
Source:  Panorama social de América Latina (ECLAC, various years).
TABLE 3
Argentina and Mexico:  Selected social protection indicators, 1990-2001
(Percentages)
Over 65, Salaried Salaried Unemployed
with access to workers with workers entitled persons covered
Formal Informal retirement benefits access to health to severance by unemployment
sector a sector b Total or pension insurance through compensation compensation
employment
Argentina
1992 86.6 34.6 70.6 76.1 67.5 67.0
1996 82.2 30.0 66.3 73.4 63.0 60.0 2.7




2000 63.0 12.1 47.6c 19.0c 39.0 20.0c
53.0d 24.6d 22.0d
Source: ILO (2003); Gasparini, 2004.
a Salaried workers employed by businesses with more than five workers and the public sector.
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each case. Some authors argue that, in general terms,
to be a worker in Latin America is equivalent to being
poor; thus, one need not be unemployed to be below
the poverty threshold (Portes and Hoffman, 2003). The
Mexican and Argentine experiences, however, entail
significant nuances that help to explain the specific
characteristics of the problem in different contexts.
The relationship between employment and
poverty in Mexico and Argentina –at least until the
late 1990s– was particularly lopsided. As shown in
table 4, the most dynamic segments of the labour market
in Mexico were precisely those with the highest levels
of poverty and lack of access to social benefits. In 2002,
urban poverty affected 32% of the urban population
and 25% of the employed. It reached 40% among wage
earners employed by microenterprises and 46% among
domestic workers. Among salaried workers employed
by businesses with more than five workers and non-
professional self-employed workers in the industrial
and construction sectors (segments which comprise
half of the employed urban EAP), it reached 27%.
While poverty levels among the overall population
of Argentina surpassed those of Mexico in 2002,
poverty among the employed was similar in both
countries. This suggests a stronger relationship between
employment and poverty in Mexico and a higher level
of unemployment among lower-income sectors in
Argentina. Consequently, while one need not be
unemployed to be poor in Argentina, the poor are
particularly vulnerable to unemployment, as
illustrated by the employment profile of poor
households in both countries (see table 5). Although
poverty among the employed is lower in Argentina, it
should be noted that, between 1999 and 2002, it grew
at a faster rate than it did for the population as a whole.
As a result, the low wages typical of jobs generated
during this period may be moving Argentina closer to
the trends observed in Mexico. The two countries have
thus been levelling downward as a result of
deteriorating employment conditions in Argentina,
rather than any improvement in Mexico.
The employment profile of poor households shows
a rise in participation rates in both countries, although
the increase was greater in Argentina. While
participation rates were similar in both countries in
2002, poor households in Argentina displayed lower
levels of occupational density and higher
unemployment, as well as a marked deterioration in
the average income of employed household members.
The strategy of sending more members of the
household into the labour market yielded different
results in each country. In Mexico, it increased the
occupational density of poor households, albeit at very
low-income levels. In Argentina, the strategy was much
less effective, and increased the number of unemployed
household members (see table 5). A lack of work has
TABLE 4
Argentina (urban areas) and Mexico: Poverty in selected
occupational categories, 1990-2002
(As percentages of total employed urban population)
Non-professional, non-technical salaried Non-professional
workers in the private sector self-employed workers
Total Total Businesses Businesses Domestic Industry Commerce
population employed with more than with up to work and and
population 5 workers 5 workers Construction Services
Argentina
(Greater Buenos Aires)
1990 2 1 1 0 … 1 5 2 1 6 8
1994 1 3 5 … 7 1 0 4 3
1997 1 8 8 1 2 1 8 8 6
1999 2 0 1 0 9 1 7 2 2 1 4 3
2002 4 2 2 7 3 1 4 0 4 3 3 1 1 9
Mexico
1989 4 2 3 3 … … 6 0 3 2 2 8
1994 3 7 2 9 … … 5 6 … …
1996 4 5 3 8 4 1 5 9 6 3 4 8 4 1
1998 3 9 3 1 3 6 4 9 5 7 3 9 3 0
2000 3 2 2 5 2 6 4 4 3 8 3 4 2 4
2002 3 2 2 5 2 7 4 0 4 6 2 7 2 1
Source: ECLAC (2003).
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thus been added to the problem of precarious work
(work that is unstable, low-paying, unprotected, etc.).
The problem is not simply a shortfall of income, but
also an absence of income due to continually shifting,
precarious employment and recurring joblessness.
Table 6 makes it possible not only to explore the
labour characteristics of poor households in Mexico
and Argentina, but also to compare their employment
status with that of households above the poverty line
in both countries. Poor households in Argentina faced
severe unemployment in 1999-2003; 35.7% included
at least one unemployed member, and one in four
households included at least two unemployed
members. In Mexico, on the other hand, these
percentages were below 6% and 1%, respectively. A
comparison of poor and non-poor households shows that,
in Argentina, the presence of at least two employed persons
in the home helped to reduce its exposure to poverty; this
was the case in almost 40% of households above the
poverty line, compared to only 25.5% of poor households.
In Mexico, on the other hand, 46.5% of poor households
and 51.9% of non-poor households included at least two
employed members –a difference which does not appear
to be significant. The higher participation rate for
employed persons from lower-income households in the
informal sector is the most visible difference; while not
all informal-sector workers are poor (participation in this
sector is high among members of non-poor households),
most of the members of non-poor households are
employed in the informal sector.
TABLE 5
Argentina (urban areas) and Mexico: Labour profile
of poor households, 1990-2002
(Percentages)
Poverty Average size Participation Unemployment Occupational Median income of
rate of household rate a rate b density c employed persons d
Argentina
1990 16.2 4.51 0.47 ... 0.16 2 .5
2002 31.6 4 .5 0.64 0.26 0.25 1.57
Mexico
1990 39.0 6.03 0.58 ... 0.29 1 .6
2002 31.8 5 .1 0.65 0.03 0.35 1.33
Source: ECLAC (2004a).
a Economically active population (EAP), including employed and unemployed/Working-age population.
b Number of unemployed/EAP.
c Number of employed/Number of members in the household.
d Expressed as a fraction of the value of the poverty line.
TABLE 6
Argentina (urban areas) and Mexico: Labour characteristics of poor
and non-poor households, 1999-2003
(Percentage of households by employment situation of members)
At least 1 At least 2 At least 1 At least 2 Inactive Persons working
employed employed unemployed unemployed head of in the
person persons person persons household informal sector
A. Non-poor households
Argentina 76.9 39.2 14.2 1.2 30.7 39.8
Mexico 92.1 51.9 3.9 0.7 16.2 51.3
B. Poor households
Argentina 76.6 25.5 35.7 9.2 23.3 47.3
Mexico 93.1 46.5 5.3 0.9 13.9 69.7
Source: ECLAC (2004a).
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IV
Unequal distribution of opportunities
and entrapment in disadvantaged situations
The above analysis of the relationship between poverty
and the various manifestations of labour precarity
shows a gradual erosion of the mechanisms that had
previously ensured economic survival and allowed
people to earn an income. The possibility of “making
a living” by working, at least in a steady job, has
become increasingly uncertain.
The severely diminished role of work and
education as channels for social mobility –or at least
as a basis for expectations of future improvement– and
growing inequities in the distribution of job and
educational opportunities are indications that the
social structure is becoming increasingly rigid. In other
words, the manoeuvring room for overcoming
disadvantageous situations for persons from
underprivileged households –in terms of income,
employment, education, housing and other aspects– is
shrinking as the environment becomes more and more
hostile towards those who do not possess strong
cognitive abilities and social skills. The lack of these
resources leads to entrapment in life chances marked
by a “spiral of precariousness” (Paugam 1995), where
disadvantages accumulate and reinforce each other.
These processes were manifested even more
harshly after the social reforms adopted during the
1990s, which were not only a correlate of adjustments
in the economic sector but also increased the
vulnerability of large sectors of the population.
Universal coverage of State health and education
services was found to be inefficient, as it favoured
middle-income sectors at the expense of lower-income
ones. Targeting strategies were implemented to change
this distributional “bias” and decentralize services. The
result of this effort was what Bustelo (1992), quoting
an expression coined by Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
described as the “Estado de malestar” (“badfare
State”), which led to the dismantling of programmes in
which the incipient welfare State had achieved some
degree of progress. The psychosocial dimension of this
phenomenon was evident in the freezing of prospects
for upward mobility, the loss of expectations for an
improved quality of life and a dogmatically
individualistic ethos in which everyone was left to his
or her own fate in an atmosphere of growing social
polarization (Bustelo, 1992).
1. Hardening of the social structure
(a) Unequal distribution of educational
opportunities
The distribution of educational opportunities is
one of the clearest signs of the widening gap that
separates the privileged from the underprivileged. This
inequity is especially significant in an environment in
which access to knowledge is a key to opening up the
opportunities offered by ongoing processes, and the
lack of such access increases and accelerates the
processes of exclusion that affect the more vulnerable
sectors.
Reimers (2000) lists five processes whereby
disparities in income distribution lead to disparities in
educational opportunities in Latin America. They are:
(i) differential access for the poor and non-poor to
different levels of education; (ii) differential treatment
of the poor and non-poor in school, whereby the former
receive a lower-quality education; (iii) the growing
tendency of students to associate only with peers of
the same socioeconomic background; (iv) the
contribution of parents to their children’s education,
with better-educated parents contributing more; and
(v) the existence of educational curricula and processes
that are not specifically designed to reduce inequality.
The relationship between income distribution and
distribution of educational opportunities helps to
explain the importance and social value traditionally
attached to education in Argentina and Mexico, given
its potential for fostering integration and promoting
social mobility.26  Around the mid-1990s, a reverse
26 In Latin America, the educational Gini coefficient (which
measures inequality in the distribution of education) was 50.1
in 1960, 47.0 in 1970, 43.1 in 1980 and 41.8 in 1990. During
the same period, these coefficients in Argentina were 34.4,
31.1, 29.4 and 27.3, and in Mexico they were 56.0, 51.0, 49.7
and 38.4 (World Bank, 2003). These figures reflect the higher
level of educational equity that has historically characterized
Argentina in the region.
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relationship existed between the distribution of
educational opportunities and income distribution in
the two countries. Argentina ranked first among 19
Latin American countries in terms of educational equity
and fifth in income distribution, whereas Mexico
ranked twelfth and eighth, respectively (Reimers, 2000,
table 4.1). In other words, in Argentina the social gap,
in terms of income, has historically been wider than
the educational gap, whereas in Mexico marked
differences in income distribution are accompanied by
even greater inequality in the distribution of
educational opportunities. This helps to explain the
key role played by the extension of public education
in Argentina as a promoter of social mobility and a
source of integration and social belonging. The role of
education in this regard is much weaker in Mexico,
where the wide educational gap between high- and
low-income sectors, the high degree of segmentation
in terms of the quality of education and the very low
educational levels of the poorest 40% of the population
are dramatic indicators of the abysmal social
differences that characterize the Mexican social
structure (see table 7).
Here again, the disruptive impact of the neoliberal
economic model has been deeper in Argentina, where
the educational gap between the richest 20% and the
poorest 20% of the population widened even more than
in Mexico, rising from 4.7 to 6.1 (see table 7). The
deterioration of educational levels in the poorest
quintile in Argentina is significant since, rather than
improving, they actually became slightly worse. This
would appear to reflect not only a growing
segmentation of the social structure, but also the
stagnation of educational opportunities for the poorest
sectors.
Although in general terms the region is moving
towards an improvement in access to primary education
for the poor, disparities remain –or have become
sharper– precisely in those levels that are crucial to
social mobility. Educational credentials play a more
and more decisive role in determining access to “good”
jobs, which are increasingly scarce. The higher
schooling levels of the active population have led not
only to a gradual devaluation of education, but also to
increased exclusion of the less-educated sectors, whose
job opportunities have deteriorated significantly. As
the educational level of the population has improved,
the minimum years of schooling required to obtain a
job that pays wages above the poverty threshold has
risen. Although a complete secondary education –or
the equivalent of 12 years of school– is the minimum
level required, it is becoming inadequate due to the
increasing importance attributed to the quality of
education. Years of schooling no longer constitute a
passport into modern jobs; the “password” appears to
be based on the provenance of educational credentials
and the social capital of an individual’s family (Filmus
and Miranda, 1999).27
The gaps are widest at the secondary and tertiary
levels. Increased educational coverage has failed to
reduce differences between young people from different
social strata. Disparities in educational opportunities
become more pronounced from the age of 13 onward
(see table 8). It is interesting to note that, in Mexico,
the percentage of young people between the ages of
13 and 19 from the poorest deciles who were attending
school remained practically stagnant between 1992
and 2002 (having risen from 55.6% to 57.6%), whereas
in the top two deciles it rose from 80.7% to 92.8%. In
both Argentina and Mexico, despite the improvements
noted during the 1990s, the gap in the 20-24 age group
increased sharply. In 2002, school attendance among
the richest 20% was triple that of the poorest 20%.
According to data for the year 2000, among urban
youth aged from 20 to 24 –regardless of whether or not
they were better educated than their parents– there were
38% in Argentina and 46% in Mexico who did not
TABLE 7
Argentina and Mexico: Years of schooling in
the adult populationa, by income quintile.
1992-2001
1992 2001
Quintiles Argentina Mexico Argentina Mexico
1 7.5 2.7 7.3 3.5
2 8.0 4.1 8.3 5.3
3 8.7 6.6 9.2 8.1
4 9.8 6.6 10.6 8.1
5 12.2 10.0 13.4 11.6
Average 9.5 6.1 10.1 7.4
Educational 4.7 7.3 6.1 8.1
gap (Q5-Q1)
Source: World Bank (2003).
a Population aged 25 to 65.
27 Between 1999 and 2003, only 6.4% of poor heads of
household in Mexico and 17.8% in Argentina had received
more than 12 years of schooling. In more than half of poor
Mexican households, the head of household had received less
than six years of schooling (ECLAC, 2004a).
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have access to the basic educational capital28  needed
to aspire to a relatively well-paid job (ECLAC, 2004b).
This is an indicator of the serious initial disadvantages
that beset young people from low-income households
as they try to enter the labour market. It also explains
why they are likely to become entrapped in inferior
opportunities throughout their life courses and how
this situation is likely to be reproduced across
generations.
The persistent linkage between access to education
and a person’s social stratum of origin suggests that, to
a large extent, the opportunities for well-being that are
currently available to young people have already
been determined by the pattern of inequalities that
prevailed in the previous generation. This translates
into a rigid social structure with little social mobility
(ECLAC, 2004b, p. 192).
(b) The weakening of the role of work as a channel
for social mobility
With regard to opportunities for occupational
mobility, some recent studies in Mexico and Argentina
show that persons working in occupations requiring
lower skill levels have little chance of improving their
situation and are likely to become entrapped in the
most precarious situations.
In their analysis of intergenerational social
mobility in urban areas of Mexico, Cortés and Escobar
Latapí (2005) note that, compared to the import-
substitution industrialization stage (before 1982),
opportunities for social mobility declined for all strata
during the economic restructuring period (1988-1994).
The impact was much more pronounced, however,
among the lower income strata – unskilled industrial
workers, informal workers in the service sector,
ejidatarios (farmers who work on community land),
small rural landowners and day workers. The authors
note that under the new economic model, there was a
widening of the differences in opportunities available
to the lower classes and to the upper class –
professionals, civil servants and employers of more
than five workers. Thus, as inequality has increased,
the system of occupational mobility has become less
flexible, and the occupation of an individual’s father
has become a stronger predictor of the occupation that
person will have (Cortés and Escobar Latapí, 2005).
In Argentina, Kessler and Espinoza (2003) have
noted two particularly important aspects of emerging
patterns of social mobility during the 1990s. First, as
in Mexico, there has been a blocking of opportunities
for upward occupational mobility among the most
disadvantaged sectors. To this must be added the
changes that have occurred in the occupational
structure – a relative increase in the availability of jobs
requiring skill levels that can only be filled by middle-
income sectors, coupled with a drop in the number of
jobs that can be filled by low-income sectors. Another
element is the need to redefine the meaning of social
mobility in the current economic environment. The
authors discuss the experiences of workers who appear
to have achieved upward occupational mobility in
recent years and point to the disconnect between the
improvement in job prestige and the social rewards that
used to be associated with those jobs; thus, a process of
“spurious mobility” appears to be taking place.29
TABLE 8
Argentina and Mexico: School attendance in urban areas, by household
per capita income quintile and age group, 1990-2002
(As a percentage of the population in the same age group)
Ages 7-12 Ages 13-19 Ages 20-24
20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Total Lowest Highest Total Lowest Highest Total Lowest Highest
Argentina
1990 98.4 97.9 100 68.8 62.6 79.3 23.6 12.4 39.8
2002 99.4 99.1 100 83.2 76.3 96.4 40.6 21.7 61.6
Mexico
1992 97.4 95.8 99.5 62.7 55.6 80.7 23.9 7.1 47.3
2002 98.1 96.3 99.6 68.9 57.6 92.8 30.7 16.4 55.1
Source: ECLAC (2004a).
28 Completion of at least 12 years of schooling.
29 There has been a change in the functional relationship among
education, occupation and income and in how one factor
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Conclusions
The above analysis provides a better picture of the
forms which the relationship between income
distribution and social exclusion assumes in Latin
America. High inequality in the distribution of
educational and occupational opportunities –and,
hence, of social protection– provide stark evidence of
the fact that income levels play a key role in
determining the degree of access to social services and,
more and more, the quality of the services received.
This has led to a growing polarization and segmentation
between first- and second-class citizens. The household
into which a person is born is an increasingly strong
predictor of the position he or she will have in the
social structure. Initial advantages or disadvantages
are not only maintained –and deepened– over a
person’s life course, but also tend be reproduced across
generations.
This entrapment in cycles of deprivation – in terms
of education, employment, income, housing, social
networks – or, in other words, the increasing difficulties
faced by the most disadvantaged sectors in trying to
escape those cycles, sheds light on the exclusionary
effects of the neoliberal model adopted by Latin
American societies –at different rates and to varying
degrees– over the past two decades. These societies
are characterized not only by greater inequities and
segmentation, but also by more rigid social structures
and fewer opportunities and expectations of social
mobility.
The integrative capacity of import-substitution
industrialization fuelled the hopes of broad sectors of
the population, who believed that “by working long
and hard” they could improve their prospects, own a
house, gain access to better educational opportunities
for their children, build a life for themselves – in short,
aspire to “a better future”. This optimism gradually
began to wane in the 1980s, and the 1990s brought a
definite break with the “past”. The devastating effects
of the fiction of a self-regulating market on the social
fabric (Polanyi, 1957) became especially evident when
existing social protection mechanisms were dismantled,
without any policy in place to prevent or mitigate the
social costs of adjustment policies and economic
restructuring processes.
The relationship between job instability, poverty
and a lack of social protection during the period under
review was manifested in different ways in Mexico and
Argentina. In Mexico, low income levels and a high
degree of labour precarity cast doubts on the efficacy
of increasing the number of earners in the household
as a safeguard against poverty. In other words, greater
occupational density, in and of itself, does not make a
household less vulnerable to poverty; the quality of
people’s employment, which is highly stratified, is the
decisive factor. In Argentina, the marked labour
deterioration was accompanied by high levels of
unemployment, which affected the entire employed
population but had the most serious impact on the most
vulnerable sectors, given their job precarity and low
educational levels. Moreover, persistently high
unemployment levels –notwithstanding the
considerable decline experienced from 2002 onward–
may indicate a rise in poverty among the employed
population of Argentina. This suggests that in
Argentina, as in Mexico, employment is gradually
losing strength as a means of escaping poverty.
Employment, as this analysis of Argentina and
Mexico shows, is not only an increasingly scarce
commodity, but also a poor-quality one. Access to
better occupational opportunities is strongly
determined by abilities and cognitive skills to which
large sectors have no access. In such a context, highly
segmented and polarized patterns of integration and
belonging emerge, become consolidated and deepen.
This multiplicity of disadvantages can hardly be
addressed using approaches and policies that confine
social problems to sectors living in extreme poverty,
and thus contribute to the deepening of dualism and
social segmentation, as well as the spreading of
vulnerability to all those sectors that are not part of the
target population and have no chance of gaining access
to the protection systems provided by the market.
influences the others. Education does not necessarily help a person
obtain a better job, and having a better job does not guarantee a
better income. Given the general deterioration of working
conditions, it is quite likely that jobs that had traditionally ranked
high in the occupational structure are actually of poorer quality
than in the past (Kessler and Espinoza, 2003).
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As Esping-Andersen (2002) has noted, the key to
guaranteeing people’s well-being is not simply to focus on
those sectors whose income levels are below the poverty
threshold and/or who live in precarious conditions at any
given moment. The highest priority must be to identify
those groups that are most likely to persistently remain in
low-income jobs and precarious living conditions. A
comprehensive and dynamic approach is therefore required,
both to address the problem and to devise public policies
that will help anticipate and forestall disadvantageous
situations before they become irreversible.
The dilemmas and challenges posed by the
transition to more equitable, socially supportive and
inclusive societies and the need to rethink the
definition of social protection call for the adoption of
a more complex and dynamic approach. A new
perspective is needed both to better understand how
the “social question” is manifested in the new context
and to formulate and implement public policies that
represent a departure from the fragmented,
uncoordinated policies of today and their often
contradictory effects.
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